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ABSTRACT: This research examines the effects of sovereign downgrades on European financial 
markets between 2005 and 2012. Vector Autoregression (VAR) techniques are used to investigate the 
presence of contagion effects after a sovereign downgrade across equity indices, five year Credit 
Default Swaps (CDS) and ten year government bonds of the investigated European states. Sovereign 
downgrades are found to be associated with an increase in equity returns, and cause significant 
increases in the cost of insuring debt through CDS and the yield of government debt. The Greek and 
Irish downgrades are to found to have significant reverberations throughout European financial 
markets. German CDS spreads are found to increase when a European state is downgraded, signalling 
their use by investors as a barometer of European-wide defaults. Though credit rating agencies clearly 
missed the European sovereign crisis prior to 2007, their rating downgrades are still found to cause 
significant effects within European financial markets. 
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1. Introduction  
 Since 2010, international credit rating agencies have downgraded numerous European states, 
with the outlook for all being placed firmly under the microscope. This has raised many doubts about 
the credibility of credit rating agencies as to why they have implemented these downgrades in the 
midst of crisis, rather than during its evolution. The downgrades implemented were centralised on the 
main problematic states of Greece, Ireland, Spain, Italy and Portugal. But other states, perceived to be 
more economically stable such as France, Belgium and Austria have also been subjected to similar 
fates.  
This research specifically investigates the contagion effects of these individual downgrades 
across European financial markets, through the main financial inter-linkages provided by equity 
markets, five year credit default swaps (CDS) and ten year government debt. The credit rating 
agencies under investigation are Moody’s, Fitch and Standard and Poors. Vector autoregression 
(VAR) techniques are used to test for the presence of contagion through the implementation of dummy 
variables denoting the announcement of a sovereign downgrade. 
 The channels in which contagion may spread have increased in Europe since the establishment 
of the Euro currency in 1999. Fratzscher (2002) found that the aggregation of numerous states into this 
currency union has increased the correlation of equity returns across Europe. Sy (2009) found that 
credit rating agency announcements could cause contagion effects in Europe as a result of rating-based 
triggers such as banking regulation changes, ECB collateral rules, CDS contracts and other investment 
mandates. Areski et al. (2011) found that the holdings of foreign debt by domestic banks and 
European-wide debt within European banks could enhance contagion effects. The authors focused on 
the effects of ratings announcements for European countries between 2007 and 2010 to find significant 
spillover effects. Ehrmann et al. (2010) uncovered evidence of substantial international spillover 
effects across numerous international asset classes during the recent crisis, while Kiff et al. (2012) 
found evidence supporting rating agency failure during the European crisis and conclude that ratings 
should incorporate obligor’s resilience to stress scenarios in their methodology. 
 Bissoondoyal-Bheenick (2012) argued that there are more significant spillover effects after a 
rating change when links in financial markets are analysed in comparison to similar trade links, and 
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that there appears to be a contamination effect in terms of contagion present for both upgrades and 
downgrades. Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2012) investigated pre and post-crisis rating agency decisions 
for countries in Europe and Central Asia to find strong spillover effects through currency markets, 
with the magnitude of these spillover effects more pronounced in crisis periods rather than periods of 
relative financial calm. De Santis (2012) investigated the influence of rating agencies in spreading 
crisis to Europe from Greece, Ireland and Portugal. This research finds that three factors can explain 
the recorded developments in sovereign spreads: an aggregate regional risk factor, the country-specific 
credit risk and the spillover effect from Greece. Gande and Parsley (2005) found that a country’s 
rating downgrade has a significant negative effect on the sovereign bond spreads of other countries.  
Li et al. (2008) investigated contagion effects from rating announcements in Asia from 1990-
2003 to find that the contagion effect caused a rating announcement in one country to affect stock 
market returns in other crisis-influenced countries. Alternatively, El-Shagi (2010) could not find 
evidence supporting the same hypothesis, finding that the accusations against credit rating agencies 
were unconvincing given that most downgrades of sovereign debt occurred towards the end of a crisis. 
Afonso et al. (2011) investigated financial market inter-linkages in the time period before and after a 
ratings announcement. The authors find significant responses of government bond yield spreads to 
changes in rating notations and outlook, with announcements not anticipated at the one to two month 
horizon but there is bi-directional causality between ratings and spreads within two weeks after the 
announcement. The spillover effects are also found to run from lower ranked countries to those with a 
higher ranking and there are persistent effects present for recently downgraded countries.  
To effectively model the European crisis and the effects of rating agencies’ announcements, 
event studies were found to be inappropriate in capturing the spillover effects between markets. Thus 
in light of the models used by Arezki et al. (2011) inspired by the previous work of Favero and 
Giavazzi (2002), a VAR (Vector Autoregression) framework is found to be most appropriate, with 
dummy variables implemented to capture the effect of sovereign rating news on the included equity, 
five year CDS (Credit Default Swap) and ten year sovereign bond markets. This enables the capture of 
the dynamics spillover effects of rating agency announcements on these specific financial markets by 
controlling for the lagged effects of fluctuations in these asset classes.  
 The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the credit rating 
agencies reaction to the sovereign debt crisis. Section 3 introduces the data, methodology and structure 
of the models. Section 4 summarises the results of the research and section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The Reaction of Credit Rating Agencies to the European Financial Crisis 
Credit rating announcements are based on rating changes (upgrades or downgrades), revisions 
of previous outlooks and reviews for future ratings changes. These differing types of rating changes 
can occur simultaneously, even differing between the three companies investigated. There has been a 
large increase in the number of European downgrades since 2007. There has also been a significant 
increase in the number of ‘negative outlook’ changes which indicates potential downgrades within the 
next two years, and an increase in the number of ‘negative watch’ announcements which indicates an 
impending downgrade within ninety days. 
2.1. Types of credit rating announcements 
There were ninety rating announcements between the period January 2005 and January 2012 
for the main European sovereign states investigated in this research. The main downgrades and 
negative outlook changes are included in table 1. Table 2 summarises the announcements based on the 
issuing credit agency. It shows that of the ninety announcements, there were thirty-five downgrades, 
thirty-three outlook revisions and seventeen combined announcements, with five countries being 
placed on review for downgrade in the next ninety days.  
Standard and Poor is the most frequent announcer (thirty-six) and most frequent down-grader 
(fifteen). There was only one upgrade (Belgium in May 2006) for the countries investigated in the 
sample. Since then, up to January 2012, only two other European countries investigated in this 
research received a positive announcement from the three rating agencies. Table 2 also presents the 
announcements based on the outlook portrayed (either positive or negative), of which there are only 
three positive announcements in total between 2005 and 2012. 
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Table 1. Rating Agency actions for investigated European countries January 2005 to January 2012 
Number Country Agency Date change Action Grade 
1 Belgium Fitch 02/05/2006 Upgrade and stable outlook AA+ 
2 Italy Fitch 25/05/2006 Negative watch AA 
3 Italy Fitch 19/10/2006 Downgrade and stable outlook AA- 
4 Italy S&P 19/10/2006 Downgrade A+ 
5 Greece S&P 14/01/2009 Downgrade A- 
6 Ireland Fitch 06/03/2009 Negative watch AAA 
7 Ireland S&P 30/03/2009 Downgrade AA+ 
8 Ireland Fitch 08/04/2009 Downgrade and negative outlook AA+ 
9 Ireland S&P 08/06/2009 Downgrade AA 
10 Ireland Moody’s 19/07/2009 Downgrade Aa2 
11 Greece Fitch 22/10/2009 Downgrade and negative outlook A- 
12 Ireland Fitch 04/11/2009 Downgrade AA- 
13 Greece Fitch 08/12/2009 Downgrade and negative outlook BBB+ 
14 Greece S&P 16/12/2009 Downgrade BBB+ 
15 Greece Moody’s 22/12/2009 Downgrade A2 
16 Greece Fitch 09/04/2010 Downgrade and negative outlook BBB- 
17 Greece Moody’s 22/04/2010 Downgrade A3 
18 Greece S&P 27/04/2010 Downgrade BB+ 
19 Spain S&P 28/04/2010 Downgrade AA 
20 Spain Fitch 28/05/2010 Downgrade and stable outlook AA+ 
21 Greece Moody’s 14/06/2010 Downgrade Ba1 
22 Ireland S&P 24/08/2010 Downgrade AA- 
23 Spain Moody’s 30/09/2010 Downgrade Aa1 
24 Ireland Fitch 06/10/2010 Downgrade and negative outlook A+ 
25 Ireland S&P 23/11/2010 Downgrade A 
26 Ireland Fitch 09/12/2010 Downgrade and stable outlook BBB+ 
27 Ireland Moody’s 17/12/2010 Downgrade Baa1 
28 Greece Fitch 21/12/2010 Negative watch BBB- 
29 Greece Fitch 14/01/2011 Downgrade and negative outlook BB+ 
30 Ireland S&P 02/02/2011 Downgrade A- 
31 Greece Moody’s 07/03/2011 Downgrade B1 
32 Spain Moody’s 10/03/2011 Downgrade Aa2 
33 Greece S&P 29/03/2011 Downgrade BB- 
34 Ireland S&P 01/04/2011 Downgrade BBB+ 
35 Ireland Moody’s 15/04/2011 Downgrade Baa3 
36 Greece S&P 09/05/2011 Downgrade B 
37 Greece Fitch 20/05/2011 Downgrade and negative outlook B+ 
38 Belgium Fitch 23/05/2011 Negative watch AA+ 
39 Greece Moody’s 01/06/2011 Downgrade Caa1 
40 Greece S&P 13/06/2011 Downgrade CCC 
41 Ireland Moody’s 12/07/2011 Downgrade Ba1 
42 Greece Fitch 13/07/2011 Downgrade CCC 
43 Greece Moody’s 25/07/2011 Downgrade Ca 
44 Greece S&P 27/07/2011 Downgrade CC 
45 Italy S&P 19/09/2011 Downgrade A 
46 Italy Moody’s 04/10/2011 Downgrade A2 
47 Italy, Spain Fitch 07/10/2011 Downgrade A+ 
48 Spain S&P 13/10/2011 Downgrade AA- 
49 Spain Moody’s 18/10/2011 Downgrade A1 
50 Belgium S&P 26/11/2011 Downgrade and negative outlook AA 
51 
Austria, France, 
Germany, Spain, 
Ireland, Italy,  S&P 05/12/2011 Negative watch  
52 Austria Fitch 16/12/2011 Downgrade AA+ 
53 Belgium Moody’s 16/12/2011 Downgrade Aa3 
54 Ireland, Italy, Fitch 16/12/2011 Negative watch  
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Spain 
55 
Austria, France, 
Spain S&P 13/01/2012 Downgrade 
AA+, AA, 
A 
56 
Belgium, Italy, 
Spain Fitch 27/01/2012 Downgrade 
AA. AA-, 
A 
57 Italy S&P 31/01/2012 Downgrade BBB+ 
Note: The above table represents the main credit announcements in terms of downgrades from January 2005 to January 2012 
for the rating agencies S&P, Fitch and Moody’s.  
 
Table 2. Segregated rating agency actions for investigated European countries January 2005 to January 2012 
 Fitch Moody’s S&P Total 
Rating changes  
     Upgrades 1 0 0 1 
     Downgrades 7 13 15 35 
 
Outlook revision  
     Positive 1 0 0 1 
     Negative 10 9 12 31 
     Maintained 0 0 1 1 
 
Combined announcements  
     Outlook revisions with an upgrade 1 0 0 1 
     Outlook revisions with an downgrade 11 2 3 16 
 
Country under immediate review 0 0 5 5 
 
Totals 31 24 36 91 
Note: The above table represents the total number of rating agency announcements    
segregated by rating announcement type and the rating agency making the announcement.  
 
2.2. Sequencing of the European credit rating announcements 
The rating agencies presented in tables 1 and 2 were concentrated from January 2005 until 
January 2012. Table 1 shows that prior to January 2009, there were only four major announcements 
for European countries. This is clear evidence that the three rating agencies investigated in this 
research did not anticipate the economic problems in Europe. Figure 1 echoes this sentiment, 
presenting the monthly number of sovereign upgrades and downgrades compared to the median EBA 
banks (European Banking Authority) five year probability of default. The European sovereign crisis 
stemmed from an international banking crisis, but the lag between the implementation of negative 
announcements and downgrades from the three rating agencies and the peak of the European banking 
crisis is indisputable.  
Credit rating announcements are not only concentrated over time, but are also concentrated 
geographically. Table 3 describes the geographical division of rating announcements from January 
2005 until January 2012 for the European countries investigated. Greece, Ireland, Spain, Italy and 
Portugal account for over 83% of total rating agency actions. Greece has the highest number of 
downgrades, while Germany, The Netherlands and The United Kingdom had no downgrades during 
the investigated period, but were all placed under review as the crisis escalated. 
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Figure 1. Number of rating announcements and the median EBA banks five year probability of default 
 
Note: Figure 1 shows the downgrade of sovereign states and the peak of the European banking crisis (Q3 2008) as measured 
by the median EU banks probability of defaults as measured through Kamakura.  
 
       Table 3. Geographical segregation of rating agency actions from January 2005 to January 2012 
Country Rating change Outlook change Combined Under review Totals 
Austria 2 1 0 0 3 
Belgium 2 1 2 0 5 
France 1 1 0 1 3 
Germany 0 1 0 1 2 
Greece 9 5 14 0 28 
Ireland 7 4 9 0 20 
Italy 5 4 3 1 13 
Netherlands 0 0 0 1 1 
Spain 8 5 1 0 14 
United Kingdom 0 0 0 1 1 
Totals 34 22 29 5 90 
Note: The above table represents the style and geographical segregation of the rating announcements in  
the investigated period. 
 
3. Data, Methodology and Structure of the Models 
 The VAR model comprises of three equations each representing a facet of a given financial 
market, namely the main equity market index, the sovereign CDS spread and the ten year government 
bond yield. Data for the ten largest European countries are used (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and The United Kingdom). The data spans from January 
2005 until January 2012, representing 1,879 observations. To obtain robust estimators to possible 
remaining heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the residuals, a White correction is performed on 
the standard deviation of the estimated coefficient. 
A sequence of impulse dummy variables ܦ௧ , are used to indicate the release date or a 
particular announcement. VAR techniques are used to measure the return impact ݎ௜, of these ratings 
announcements on market i at time t. Formally, the relationship with the market return and the rating 
announcement news of a series of L rating announcements where j=1,……, L is expressed as: 
                          ݎ௧
௜ = ܽ௜ +∑ ܾ௜௝ܦ௧
௜
௝ + ݁௧
௜            (1)  
where ݁௧
௜ is i.i.d and represents the white noise residual. If the coefficient associated with ܦ௧  is 
significant, it indicates that the ratings announcement D leads to abnormal returns for the market i at 
time t. This specification relies on two assumptions. The first is that market i is assumed to be efficient 
as the return does not depend on past variables. Second, the specification above relies on the 
assumption that financial markets are not interrelated. Thus the model in this paper is of the form: 
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                                                ܼ௜
௧ = ߶(ܮ)ܼ௧
௜ + ݒ௧
௜ 		                     (2) 
where ܼ௜
௧is a N-dimension vector of asset prices that are taken in logarithms on market i, ߶(ܮ) is a 
NxN lag polynomial with ܮ௞ݕ௧ = ݕ௧ି௞,	ݒ௧ are reduced-form disturbances with zero means and 
constant covariance matrix with variances given by E[ݒ௧
௜]=ߪ௜ and E[ݒ௧
௜ , ݒ௧
௝]=0 for i not equal to j. As 
the model is specified in levels, the impulse dummies ܦ௧
௝  are deemed to be inappropriate. To be 
consistent with the specification in difference as in the equations above, we use step dummies that are 
represented as ܵܦ௧
௜, where ܵܦ௧ = ∑ ܦ௜ .
௝
௜ୀଵ  Hence the specification of the estimation becomes: 
    ܼ௧
௜ = ߶(ܮ)ܼ௧
௜ +∑ ܾ௜௝ܵܦ௧
௝ + ݒ௧
௜
௝           (3)      
where ܾ௜௝  is a matrix of NxK lag polynomial, with K representing the number of credit rating 
announcements included in the estimation model. Using such a specification will allow us to obtain 
unbiased estimates of the effect of the rating announcements on the markets prices of the investigated 
indices to extract the effects of the announcements ܾ௜௝ , from that of the natural structural linkages that 
exist between markets ߶(ܮ). The effects of a change in outlook or indeed the impact of multiple 
announcements are also included in the model. In the case of the effects of a rating announcement on a 
particular sovereign jurisdiction, the specification is now expressed as: 
                                        ܼ௧
௜ = ߶(ܮ)ܼ௧
௜ + ܾ௜ଵܵܦ௧
஽ீ + ܾ௜ଶܵܦ௧
ை஼ + ܾ௜ଷܵܦ௧
ெ஺ + ݒ௧
௜                   (4)   
In equation (4), DG represents downgrades, OC is the coefficient on the dummy variable for 
rating agency outlook changes and MA is based on multiple announcements. Further the specification 
for an investigation based on the source of the rating agency announcement is expressed as: 
																																			ܼ௧
௜ = ߶(ܮ)ܼ௧
௜ + ܾ௜ଵܵܦ௧
ி௜௧௖௛ + ܾ௜ଶܵܦ௧
ௌ&௉ + ܾ௜ଷܵܦ௧
ெ௢௢ௗ௬ᇱ௦ + ݒ௧
௜                 (5)  
The results of this VAR model generate estimates of the effects on each market investigated 
based on the source of the announcement. This offers evidence as to whether one rating agency was 
viewed by the market to be more or less influential than its counterparties. The next model investigates 
whether there is a difference in the impact on the investigated markets based on the initial sovereign 
rating present at the time of the announcement. In theory, the downgrade of a high investment grade 
product by one grade may have a large impact, or indeed the downgrading of a sovereign state to 
default status. The rating announcements are then segregated into high and low investment grade and 
then high and low junk grade based on the individual rating agencies grading mandates. The VAR 
models are then run to analyse any specific differences and are expressed as: 
       ܼ௧
௜ = ߶(ܮ)ܼ௧
௜ + ܾ௜ଵܵܦ௧
௛௜௚௛	௜௡௩. + ܾ௜ଶܵܦ௧
௟௢௪	௜௡௩. + ܾ௜ଷܵܦ௧
௛௜௚௛	௝௨௡௞ + ܾ௜ସܵܦ௧
௟௢௪	௝௨௡௞ + ݒ௧
௜           (6) 
The final VAR specification is based on the impact of a specific sovereign downgrade on the 
individual major European financial markets investigated. In this case, the specification changes to 
include the seven separate step dummies representing the European jurisdictions that have been 
subjected to downgrades and the VAR model investigates the effects on equity, CDS and sovereign 
bond markets separately. The models are expressed as: 
ܼ௧
௜ = ߶(ܮ)ܼ௧
௜ + ܾ௜ଵܵܦ௧
஺௨௦ + ܾ௜ଶܵܦ௧
஻௘௟ + ܾ௜ଷܵܦ௧
ி௥௔ + ܾ௜ସܵܦ௧
ீ௥௘  
                                               +ܾ௜ହܵܦ௧
ூ௧௔ + ܾ௜଺ܵܦ௧
ௌ௣௔ + ܾ௜଻ܵܦ௧
ூ௥௘ + +ݒ௧
௜                                        (7) 
 
4. Results 
 In a preliminary analysis, the Augmented Dickey Fuller Test confirms that each series 
contains a stochastic trend. Similarly, Johansen’s cointegration testing leads to the acceptance of the 
presence of at least one cointegration relationship within the equations. It is therefore important to 
separate the direct impact of the rating news from the diffusion process that exists between the 
investigated financial markets. The results of the Hausman test lead us to rejects the equality of the 
coefficients associated with the dummy variable at a minimum of the 5 per cent level. This suggests 
that there is heterogeneity of coefficients associated with the different dummy variables across the 
investigated countries. This highlights the transmission heterogeneity of rating news across European 
countries, preventing the use of panel data techniques, thus the analysis is completed on a country by 
country level. 
 To test for interdependence between markets, the model is first estimated without considering 
any exogenous variables. The results are reported in table 4. Each equation includes a lagged 
exogenous variable and the estimated coefficient is statistically significant and not different from one. 
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This result adds further confirmation to the findings of the unit root in the cointegration tests. The 
investigation highlights the existence of a transmission mechanism between the investigated markets 
and countries. Not taking such interdependence into account would not allow for discrimination 
between the impacts of rating news and the natural diffusion process that already exists in the 
investigated markets due to structural relationships. 
                               
Table 4. Interdependence between the markets under investigation 
 Austria Belgium France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Nether. Spain UK 
Variable 1: Equities 
Equities 1.062*** 1.025*** 0.951*** 1.002*** 1.022*** 1.032*** 0.977*** 0.974*** 0.984*** 0.964*** 
CDS -0.012** 0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.02*** 0.001 -0.017** -0.001 -0.02*** -0.007 
Bonds 0.091*** 0.009 0.047 -0.007 0.033 0.015 -0.023 0.041 0.018 -0.002 
Variable 2: CDS 
Equities -0.742 -0.71*** -0.68*** -0.397** -0.49*** -0.299 -0.28*** -0.692 -0.45*** -0.111 
CDS 0.862 0.791*** 0.686*** 0.753*** 0.771*** 0.748*** 0.909*** 0.818*** 0.834*** 0.882*** 
Bonds -0.053 0.214* -0.173 -0.073 0.303*** 0.561 0.348*** -0.019 0.014 -0.136* 
Variable 3: Bonds 
Equities -0.121 -0.12*** -0.09*** -0.012 -0.09*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.018 0.001 
CDS -0.011 0.006 -0.001 -0.002 0.015** 0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.027*** -0.012 
Bonds 1.161 1.203*** 1.096*** 1.151*** 1.093*** 1.194*** 1.128*** 1.149*** 1.013*** 1.035*** 
   Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses, where ***p<0.01, **p<0.05 and *p<0.10. 
 
Table 5. Impact of downgrades and downgrade by agency on the sovereign state investigated 
 Austria Belgium France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Nether. Spain UK 
Variable 1: Impact of a downgrade 
Equities 0.0012 0.0011 0.0013 0.0029* 0.0004 0.0023 0.0035* 0.0015 0.0013 0.0016 
CDS 0.0071 0.0078 0.0059 0.0096 0.0030 0.0067 0.0073 0.0084 0.0063 0.0020 
Bonds 0.0018 0.0017 0.0023 0.0029* 0.0055** 0.0038*** 0.0014 0.0004 0.0013 0.0021 
Variable 2: Impact of a Fitch downgrade 
Equities -0.0049 -0.0021 -0.002 -0.0003 0.0023 -0.0096 -0.0014 -0.0015 -0.0022 -0.0013 
CDS 0.0096 0.0075 0.0069 0.0141 0.0024 0.0023 0.0135 0.0071 0.0082 0.0053 
Bonds 0.0022 0.0067*** 0.0033 0.0004 0.0026 0.0028 0.0073*** 0.0002 0.0003 -0.0019 
Variable 3: Impact of a S&P downgrade 
Equities 0.0046* 0.0042* 0.0039 0.0056** 0.0027 0.0054* 0.0061** 0.0041 0.0031 0.0036 
CDS 0.0131 0.0114 0.0044 0.0109 0.0039 0.0069 0.0102 0.0138 0.0099 0.0047 
Bonds 0.0016 -0.0017 0.0012 0.0037 0.0083** 0.0037 -0.0004 0.0000 0.0029 0.0037 
Variable 4: Impact of a Moody’s downgrade 
Equities 0.0037 0.0005 0.0009 0.0029 -0.0075* 0.0227 0.0064* 0.0010 0.0034 0.0026 
CDS -0.0085 0.0018 0.0089 0.0019 0.0041 0.2037 -0.0075 0.0101 -0.0033 -0.0089 
Bonds 0.0016 0.0006 0.0027 0.0051 0.0074 0.0063* -0.0044 0.0010 0.0003 0.0049 
    Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses, where ***p<0.01, **p<0.05 and *p<0.10. 
 
 Table 6. Impact of negative reviews and multiple announcements on the sovereign state investigated 
 Austria Belgium France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Nether. Spain UK 
Variable 1: Impact of a negative review 
Equities -0.001 -0.0017 -0.0019 -0.0027 -0.001 -0.0019 -0.0029 -0.0007 -0.0012 -0.0007 
CDS 0.0019 0.0058 0.0032 0.0049 -0.012 0.0069 0.0043 0.0084 0.0016 0.0038 
Bonds 0.0021 0.0006 0.0033** 0.0000 -0.001 0.0000 -0.0005 0.0006 -0.0007 -0.004* 
Variable 2: Impact a multiple rating agency announcement 
Equities 0.0014 0.0001 0.0001 0.0014 0.0009 0.0011 0.0008 0.0007 -0.0000 0.0014 
CDS 0.0076 0.0118 0.0059 0.0106 0.0033 0.1597 0.0089 0.0133 0.0073 0.0035 
Bonds 0.0013 0.0006 0.0021 0.0033* 0.0034 0.0037 0.0009 0.0011 0.0013 0.0023 
    Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses, where ***p<0.01, **p<0.05 and *p<0.10. 
 
4.1. The effects of rating agency decisions on European financial markets 
The models are segregated to investigate the direct impact of a downgrade on the selected 
European financial markets. Table 5 displays the VAR results based on an included dummy variable 
signalling a downgrade and indeed, the rating agency that made the downgrade. Table 6 displays the 
VAR results by country when a negative outlook or negative review was issued. These results are also 
adopted to include simultaneous announcements, thus include downgrades with attached negative 
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outlooks and reviews (which signal consideration for further downgrades in the short to medium 
term). 
Investigating the impact of sovereign downgrades and the origin rating agency offers some 
interesting results. First, there are uniform reactions to a downgrade, through increases in equity 
market returns and the yield demanded by investors for sovereign debt. German CFD spreads also 
showed significant reactions, indicating that insurers required a higher premium for risk. This may be 
explained through the German position as a central strength of the Eurozone; therefore, the German 
CDS would have been viewed as an alternative measure of perceived European-wide risk. 
Fitch and Standard and Poors appear to have the largest impacts across the European nations 
investigated. There was a large reaction of Irish equity, CDS and bond markets to Moody’s 
downgrades. Negative reviews are associated with decreased returns across all equity markets, with 
the deepest falls in Germany, Portugal, Italy, Ireland and Spain. Greece consistently possessed the 
highest risk of default in terms of five year CDS and ten year government bond yields, but actually 
showed alleviation in pressure based on these CDS and bond yields at the time of a downgrade. When 
multiple announcements were made simultaneously, there was a sharp increase in CDS spreads, 
indicative of increased perceptions of risk and default throughout the financial community. 
 
  Table 7. Impact of downgrade based on whether investment or junk grade sovereign status 
 Austria Belgium France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Nether. Spain UK 
Variable 1: Impact of high investment grade downgrade 
Equities 0.0023 0.0029* 0.0029 0.0033 0.0039 0.0034 0.0048** 0.0029 0.0031 0.0025 
CDS -0.0049 -0.0021 -0.0009 0.0031 -0.0029 -0.0001 -0.0015 -0.003 -0.0082 -0.0012 
Bonds 0.0041** 0.0018 0.0047*** 0.0049** 0.0003 0.0031* -0.0019 0.0027 -0.0002 0.0036* 
Variable 2: Impact of low investment grade downgrade 
Equities 0.0005 0.0001 0.0004 0.0041 -0.0029 0.0034 0.0022 0.0013 -0.0004 0.0018 
CDS 0.0142 0.0205 0.0125 0.0158 0.0069 0.0154 0.0171* 0.0289 0.0228* 0.0073 
Bonds 0.0012 0.0038 0.0027 -0.0006 0.0047 0.0036 0.0056** -0.002 -0.0006 0.0014 
Variable 3: Impact of high junk grade downgrade 
Equities -0.0035 -0.0029 -0.0021 0.0001 -0.0085 -0.0039 -0.0025 -0.002 -0.0039 -0.0016 
CDS 0.0081 0.0085 0.0100 0.0194 0.0018 0.0293 0.0143 0.0253 0.0081 0.0025 
Bonds 0.0009 0.0014 0.0001 0.0026 0.0219*** 0.0131*** -0.0007 0.0008 0.0072 -0.0009 
Variable 4: Impact of low junk grade downgrade 
Equities -0.0023 -0.0028 -0.0052 -0.0031 -0.0069 -0.0045 0.0006 -0.004 0.0007 -0.0025 
CDS -0.0101 -0.0029 0.0063 0.0035 0.0033 -0.0051 -0.0094 0.0024 -0.0034 -0.0041 
Bonds -0.0018 0.0013 -0.0021 -0.0022 0.0034 -0.1093* 0.0024 -0.000 0.0037 0.0019 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses, where ***p<0.01, **p<0.05 and *p<0.10. High investment grade is denoted 
as AAA to A+ for Fitch and S&P, and Aaa to A1 for Moody’s. Low investment grade is denoted at A to BBB- for Fitch and 
S&P and A2 to Baa3 for Moody’s. High junk grade is ranked as BB+ to B for Fitch and S&P and Ba1 to B2 for Moody’s and 
finally low junk grade is ranked as B- to SD/Default for Fitch and S&P and B3 to D for Moody’s. 
 
4.2. The impact of downgrades based on rating agency grading 
 Between 2005 and 2012, Greece was the only European country identified by rating agencies 
to be in a state of default. Table 7 shows the VAR results based in the spillover effects within the 
European markets at the time of a downgrade segregated by their investment status. Variables 3 and 4 
in table 7 are based solely on the Greek downgrade. Seven states in total were downgraded. For high 
investment grade ratings, equity market returns increased initially after a downgrade, but sovereign 
debt markets showed substantial stress. This may be caused by the shock of an investment grade asset 
being identified as being in trouble. When a state has fallen to junk status, the effects of a downgrade 
are amplified, as seen in the dramatic widening of CDS spreads. This effect was evident during the 
downgrades of Portugal, Spain, Greece, Ireland and Italy. 
Once a state was downgraded to junk status, the scenario was accompanied by a fall in 
European equity markets. The PIIGS showed tremendous pressures in CDS and bond markets as the 
possibility of a European default was deemed increasingly credible. Contagion effects are also 
significant throughout European markets. Germany shows increasing stress levels through increasing 
10 year bund yields and 5 year senior CDS spreads, providing evidence that the German markets were 
indeed being used by investors as a barometer of European-wide financial health. This is particularly 
interesting as German markets were not downgraded throughout the period investigated. This 
investigation clearly shows that the effects of contagion within the Eurozone had been effectively 
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priced in by investors, who were planning for what would happen after a default rather than the 
primary question of who was going to default. 
                                   
Table 8. Impact of country-specific downgrade on sovereign financial market 
 Austria Belgium France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Nether. Spain UK 
Variable 1: Austrian downgrade 
Equities 0.0002 0.0036 0.0012 0.0043 0.0010 0.0027 0.0051 0.0076 -0.0038 0.0062 
CDS 0.0153 -0.0033 0.0289 0.0125 -0.0405 0.0143 0.0226 0.0043 0.0002 -0.0087 
Bonds -0.0044 -0.0088 -0.0050 0.0028 -0.0097 0.0025 0.0059 -0.017* -0.0044 0.0064 
Variable 2: Belgian downgrade 
Equities -0.0096 -0.0027 -0.0049 -0.0037 -0.0023 -0.0009 -0.0043 -0.0025 -0.0039 -0.0041 
CDS 0.0042 -0.0047 0.0012 0.0149 0.0273 0.0028 0.0116 0.0056 0.0008 0.0067 
Bonds 0.0011 0.0006 0.0011 -0.0069 -0.0024 -0.0034 0.0073 -0.0032 -0.0133 -0.0123* 
Variable 3: French downgrade 
Equities 0.0002 -0.0037 0.0079 0.0125 0.0088 0.0023 0.0141 0.0099 -0.0011 0.0034 
CDS -0.0099 0.0246 0.0056 0.0073 -0.0089 0.0163 0.0315 0.0421 0.0069 -0.0053 
Bonds -0.0045 0.0033 -0.0074 0.0002 0.0157 -0.0011 -0.0037 -0.025* 0.0194 -0.0005 
Variable 4: Greek downgrade 
Equities -0.0029 0.0073* -0.0033 -0.0019 -0.0043 -0.0023 -0.0019 -0.0028 -0.0024 -0.0019 
CDS 0.0094 0.0246 0.0067 0.0018 0.0112 0.0190 0.0066 0.0307 0.0012* 0.0012 
Bonds 0.0009 0.0033 0.0063 0.0011 0.0085* 0.0038 0.0033 0.0027 0.0039 0.0025 
Variable 5: Italian downgrade 
Equities 0.0060 0.0073* 0.0092 0.0138*** 0.0034 0.0064 0.0125** 0.0077* 0.0086* 0.0079* 
CDS -0.0082 -0.0046 -0.0035 0.0200 -0.0019 -0.1207 0.0042 -0.0188 -0.0037 -0.0063 
Bonds 0.0035 0.0048 0.0063 0.0111** 0.0106* -0.0013 0.0027 0.0054 -0.0072 0.0126*** 
Variable 6: Spanish downgrade 
Equities -0.0023 0.0026 0.0023 0.0045 0.0118* 0.0052 0.0092* 0.0044 0.0015 0.0038 
CDS -0.0186 0.0019 0.0036 -0.0069 -0.0233 -0.0113 -0.0033 0.0005 -0.0098 -0.0045 
Bonds 0.0071* -0.0014 0.0105** 0.0141*** -0.0079 0.0049 0.0007 0.0044 -0.0001 0.0062 
Variable 7: Irish downgrade 
Equities 0.0066* 0.0028 0.0032 0.0059* -0.0049 0.0071* 0.0064* 0.0029 0.0041 0.0037 
CDS 0.0075 0.0002 0.0114 0.0062 -0.0007 0.0331 0.0126 0.0239 0.0066 0.0084 
Bonds 0.0010 0.0025 0.0003 0.0010 0.0035 0.0124*** 0.0019 -0.0012 0.0055 -0.0001 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses, where ***p<0.01, **p<0.05 and *p<0.10. 
 
4.3. Contagion effect on European financial markets due to a sovereign downgrade 
The contagion effects of downgrades are shown in table 8. The size-adjusted inter-country 
connections, which are found to be in the worst economic health, should theoretically cause the largest 
reactions. The Austrian and Belgian downgrades were associated with simultaneous large increases in 
other states’ CDS spreads offering evidence of spill-over effects. But most interestingly the Austrian 
and French downgrades appear to relieve pressure from the Greek situation, perhaps as investor’s re-
evaluated the potential recapitalisation and quantitative easing actions of the ECB and indeed the 
imposed restrictions of the IMF, given the clear evidence of contagion being already present. Greek 
CDS spreads also show pressure reduction when their struggling counterparts Italy, Spain and Ireland 
were downgraded. This may be evidence of the shifting focus of international financial markets as 
different states were placed under the spotlight. At the time of these rating decisions, the sheer turmoil 
and panic across states was so immense that nobody could be certain of whom was next to be in focus. 
The interactions between the struggling states are clearly obvious, with a downgrade of one being 
priced by the market as a faltering of the Eurozone as a whole.  
Also of note are the German CDS and bond reactions to the Italian and Spanish downgrades. 
There is a sharp widening of CDS spreads and increase in the European benchmark German bund-
rates, signifying the stresses present as larger-nations became victim to the negative sentiment offered 
by the rating agencies. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper investigates the contagion effects of sovereign rating agency announcements across 
the main European financial markets using daily data on the investigated countries’ domestic equity 
indices, five year senior credit default swaps (CDS) and ten year sovereign government-issued bonds 
during the period 2005-2012. It finds that downgrades were associated with an increase in equity 
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returns with a simultaneous increase in the yields demanded for sovereign debt. German CDS spreads 
show a large increase, indicative of their use as a European-wide barometer of default based on the 
widespread potential for contagion effects to escalate and spread given the market expectations 
throughout of a default of a European state.  
In terms of the individual rating agencies, both Fitch and S&P were associated with the largest 
impacts on financial markets. Negative reviews were also found to have a negative impact on the 
investigated markets, with the outlook of this announcement indicating a downgrade in the next ninety 
days. Simultaneous announcements are found to have a much more pronounced negative effect, 
dampening investor aspirations as the announcements are associated with a downgrade of a European 
state with an outlook of further downgrades on the horizon. There is also a correlation between the 
starting point of the credit rating of a country being downgraded and the depth of the spillover effects 
found using the VAR methodology, again with the focus of negative investors shifting to Germany as 
the centre-piece European state. The growth of the European Union has enabled this phenomenon, as 
investors now clearly see the contagion trail between all the interconnected European states and 
Germany as the largest sovereign state in the conglomerate.  
Overall, credit rating agencies are found to have a significant influence in terms of initiating 
contagion effects on the European financial markets examined in this paper. The methodology and 
modelling of the sovereign states they monitor must be called into question, as if they see fit to 
downgrade European nations emphatically since 2010, why is it that they did not do so in the 
escalation of the crisis. The rating agencies must now learn from their mistakes, primarily to regain 
credibility with the financial community, but also given the important role through the significant 
effects that they have been found to possess on financial markets.  
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